The use of cell phones is a perfect example. This is widely used and accepted technology, but the response of libraries has been, in many cases, to limit the use of cell phones or ban their use completely. Cell phones are a symptom of a deeper problem--the inability of the library to adapt to change. In many cases, as most librarians will attest, libraries are woefully behind the curve. Librarians have created a vast literature aimed at understanding these technological changes and their implications for libraries.
In many cases the solutions for libraries are expressed in terms of the need for organizational restructuring or technological enhancements to increase and enhance the level of service to users. This lack of knowledge and use of this concept places libraries at perpetual disadvantage compared to other organizations which have made use of the concept.
Increased awareness of this cycle would benefit libraries by making them able to adapt to change better and faster to the needs of their users and, more importantly, allow libraries to better articulate their reactions to change. When combined with a basic knowledge of game theory the result for libraries can be more optimal outcomes in a wide range of areas from operational questions to strategic planning.
The concept of the OODA cycle was first developed in the s for military applications. The originator of the theory, Colonel John Boyd, in an analysis of air-to-air combat outcomes postulated a scenario in which one side in a conflict presented the other with a sudden, unexpected challenge or series of challenges to which the other side could not adjust in a timely manner. As a result, the side with the slower response was defeated, and it was often defeated at a small cost to the victor.
In Boyd's paradigm, victors consistently are able to recycle through the OODA loop or Boyd Cycle, faster and this gave them an advantage over their adversaries. Nevertheless, there is still an incentive to perform a free-riding strategy by choosing a high extraction rate HER as long as the other player prefers a low extraction rate LER option, in order to achieve the highest possible payoff, which can be visualized in Table 4. In this particular real-world application, Qatar enjoys the benefits of a higher extraction rate HER in a free-riding strategy.
In contrast, Iran is making the least profit from these common oil and gas resources in the current situation by adopting the strategy of low extraction rate LER Esmaeili et al. Nonetheless, the current situation can change as soon as Iran implements a different strategy in order to achieve a higher extraction rate. Hunting stags is a quite challenging task where if both hunters decide to hunt a stag alone, their chance of success will be minimal.
Non Cooperative Planning Theory
In other words, hunting a stag is the most beneficial for both players but requires a lot of trust and commitment among them. In other words, if one of the players makes the decision to hunt a hare, the one who has remained faithful to their initial commitment will be harmed and will not be able to hunt a stag Fiani, Esmaeili et al. Both countries have two possible strategies: i maximum extraction rate MER , the highest oil and gas production rate in the shortest time; and ii low extraction rate LER , the lowest oil and gas production rate according to the reservoir conditions.
The logical structure behind the exploration of these shared resources is that if both countries cooperate and explore these fields with a reasonable extraction rate, less than the maximum rate, the long-term benefits of proper maintenance will exceed the revenue losses from extracting less than the maximum Esmaeili et al. Fiani argued that the best outcome for both players in a classical Stag Hunt game strongly depends on their commitment to their initial agreement Table 5.
The highest outcome for both countries is a Nash equilibrium that comprehends the strategy of a low extraction rate LER. There is also another Nash equilibrium when both players choose a maximum extraction rate MER. The current situation states that the oil extraction rate of Iraq is more than double than the rate of Iran.
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It means that Iraq assumed a free-riding strategy and achieved better outcomes than Iran in this situation. However, it is expected that in the near future both countries reach an agreement to develop their common oil and gas resources, which should result in long-term benefits for both Esmaeili et al. Inaba ; proposed a realistic application of a Stag Hunt game based on historical examples of business cooperation in Japanese oil and petrochemical plants, especially in the matters of energy-saving, actions on environmental problems, security of global competitiveness, and restructuring of production systems.
This game is composed of two oil and petrochemical companies A and B that are evaluating the possibilities of cooperating and executing joint operations. Hence, both companies can assume two possible strategies: i continue with their independent business; and ii perform business cooperation. The main goal of this game is to evaluate the payoffs for both companies by choosing collaborative cooperation or by keep undertaking independent business, following the logical structure of a classical Stag Hunt game.
It is possible to see that the business coordination strategy is that with the highest payoffs, even with different values for each player, as is the Nash equilibrium of this game. In other words, both companies can achieve higher outcomes when they coordinate with each other and execute joint operations. Both companies will receive intermediate gains when their strategy is to keep undertaking independent business, which is another Nash equilibrium. Fiani defines this classical game as a dangerous form of destructive competition, where two teenagers drive at high-speed towards each other to see who will deviate first.
This particular region has several historical border controversy issues. In , an incident occurred when Iranian troops invaded this region for some period, and later left the territory due to a possible military reaction from Iraq. Therefore, in this situation, Iran and Iraq can assume two strategies: i C , abandoning the region and not exploring the oil and gas resources; and ii D , staying in the region and benefiting from the oil and exploration. Table 7 shows the payoffs for each player in this realworld situation.
The payoff outcomes indicated two Nash equilibria when players assume different strategic options, such as C, D or D, C , where one of the countries would explore and produce the oil field obtaining the greatest benefits, while the other player would leave the area empty-handed Esmaeili et al.
Non-Cooperative Planning Theory | SpringerLink
The other possible outcomes of this conflict happen when both players select the same strategy C , resulting in both countries leaving the field unexploited for the future. If both countries chose D , a catastrophic outcome would happen, which could lead to military action, being the lowest payoff for both countries considering the high political risks Esmaeili et al. Each player prefers a different option, however, it is more important for them to go together than each one going individually to their preferred event. This game represents a situation in which players always have better payoffs when their decisions are coordinated, even with distinct preferences about an action to be performed Fiani, Schitka proposed a realistic application of an oil and gas reservoir allocation based on a classical Battle of the Sexes game.
Assuming that both players agreed to make a joint reservoir development or unitization arrangement, another issue would show up. This issue is characterized as the allocation formula, which will determine what portion of the produced oil and gas each landowner will receive. This allocation formula can create several potential conflicts during the reservoir unitization negotiations to determine how the resources will be explored, and how the earnings will be distributed to the landowners. The main assumption of this game is that both players are in a more advantageous position by agreeing on an appropriated allocation formula, than when each one pursues their individual interests Schitka, , as demonstrated by the players payoffs in Table 8.
However, only the coordination of both players in the same strategy will prevent them from having negative payoffs. In other words, both coordinated strategies are identified as Nash equilibria, indicating a more efficient development of the common reservoirs, allowing more oil and gas to be extracted than otherwise would have been possible by each player by themself. Schitka mentioned that unitization agreements or joint developments were not a trivial negotiation because of the potential conflicts of interest between both landowners.
Hence, several techniques should be used to promote coordinated negotiations, such as: i tit-for-tat strategy: one party gives up something in the negotiation in exchange for the other party making a similar concession; ii promotion of coalition solutions: the ability to formulate proposals that may simultaneously advance the interests of everyone involved in the negotiation; and iii cramdown options: negotiation possibilities that allow an agreement in a multilateral conciliation and by meeting some threshold Schitka, Wood et al.
The OPEC countries are characterized as a set of countries with abundant oil reserves joined together in an association to defend their specific interests. During the s and s, about three-quarters of the proven oil and gas reserves in the world were located in OPEC countries Mommer, Significant changes in the oil and gas industry were identified during this period s and s , where OPEC countries and major oil companies were fighting to get overall market control and not caring so much about price or revenue Johnston, According to Wood et al.
Boyd Cycle Theory in the Context of Non-Cooperative Games: Implications for Libraries
The proposed game assumed that the OPEC countries could have two strategies: i full production active rule , supplying the world with abundant oil at low prices; and ii prorate passive rule , cutting the oil production to a specific fraction of the available output. On the other hand, the Seven Sisters strategies were identified as the following: i dominate active rule , struggling to set oil prices and production levels; and ii acquiesce passive rule , letting the OPEC countries control the prices and the production levels while focusing on other aspects of the oil industry, such as logistics and end-use sales.
Table 9 shows the payoffs associated with the possible strategies of both players. The Nash equilibria would only be achieved when both players agreed to coordinate and choose the same strategy. These payoff outcomes indicated that this was a leader-follower model, which offered the greatest payoffs for both players when they cooperated, and the leader earned a slightly higher payoff than the follower.
Consequently, the game assumes that Petrobras was regularly the leading agent with strong interests in these negotiations with several other oil and gas private companies operating in Brazil Company 2. The game is structured by two possible strategies: i cooperate C ; and ii not cooperate NC. It is possible to visualize that the Nash equilibrium, and the best strategy for both players happened when both companies decided to cooperate. In the same way, the worst strategy was identified when both players did not cooperate. However, non-cooperation strategies could result in a potential loss of business partners and financial strength for new ventures of Petrobras in the future.
Fattouh et al.
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There is a huge trade-off identified between these two objectives, depending on market conditions and the behavior of other major oil producers. The game is structured by assuming two strategies: i cutting oil output; and does not change oil output.
These market conditions were evaluated in two different strategic games by assuming an elastic and an inelastic US shale oil supply. If the US shale oil supply is elastic, an oil output cut by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries will not likely influence the oil price because it would be replaced by the oil produced from US shale. On the other hand, by assuming that the US shale is inelastic, an oil output cut by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries would influence the oil price. Your Account Logout. The Planning Game. By Alex Lord. Edition 1st Edition.
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